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PENSIONERS, BONDHOLDERS, AND UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION IN MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
Andrew B. Dawson†
Detroit recently confirmed its plan of debt adjustment under which the
city has endeavored to adjust its pension obligations. The court’s
confirmation order and oral opinion on the record present what is perhaps
the most significant decision regarding a key question facing any city
attempting to adjust pensions in bankruptcy: can a city propose to pay its
pension claimants significantly more than its other unsecured creditors?
This question involves interpreting the Bankruptcy Code’s unfair
discrimination rule.
The Detroit bankruptcy court applied a novel interpretation of unfair
discrimination, eschewing the relatively thin body of case law interpreting
this rule, and suggesting that the rule should have a municipal bankruptcyspecific meaning.
This article contends that there is no need for such a specialized
interpretation of unfair discrimination. Many of the factors that motivated
the court’s departure from the case law can actually be addressed more
effectively under the case law developed for corporate reorganization.
Adhering to the corporate reorganization statute has statutory and historical
support. Further, such a rule would provide a more workable structure for
determining when discrimination is unfair.
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INTRODUCTION
Unfunded pension obligations are the major story in municipal
financial distress, as cities struggle to meet their pension obligations while
still meeting their other debt obligations, investing in infrastructure
improvements, and providing services to residents.1 States face significant
obstacles in addressing the problem of underfunded pensions on their own.2
Not only do states face the usual Contracts Clause constraints on impairing
contractual obligations, but some states give constitutional protection to
pension obligations.3

1. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Chicago’s Mind Blowing $33 Billion Debt and Pension
Obligations, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/18/chicagos-mind-blowing-33-billion-debt-and-pensionobligations/ (describing Chicago’s challenge of properly funding its pensions); see also A
Widening Gap in Cities: Shortfalls in Funding for Pensions and Retiree Health Care, PEW
CENTER
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2013/
Pew_city_pensions_report.pdf (reporting that the largest 61 cities in the United States had
pension shortfalls of $99 billion in fiscal year 2009, a number which increased 15% among
the 40 reporting cities in 2010).
2. Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5
EDUCATION,
FINANCE
&
POLICY
617,
617
(2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573864 (providing “an overview of the legal limitations on the
ability of states to amend their existing pension plans with respect to current participants.”).
3. Id., (listing Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7), Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art.
XXIX, § 1), New York (N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7) and Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5) as
examples). As described below, Michigan likewise has such a constitutional pension
protection.
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Faced with the prospect of defaulting on bond obligations, driving out
residents by imposing even higher property taxes, and cutting important
services, municipalities have looked to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code 4
as a means to adjust their pension obligations. Most notably, the City of
Detroit’s bankruptcy filing has brought this issue to the forefront, but it is
not alone. Already, the city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, has restructured
its pension obligations through Chapter 9,5 and Stockton, California,
considered doing so as well.6
In all three of these cities, a major question was whether the city could
confirm a plan that provided for a significantly larger recovery for pension
claimants than for other unsecured claimants, namely the municipal
bondholders. That is, even if pension claims have the same distribution
priority as bondholders and other unsecured claimants, can the city
nevertheless favor pensioners over other claimants (or vice versa)?
Bankruptcy law permits a debtor to separately classify creditors, with each
class of creditors entitled to vote on the plan. If any class opposes the
debtor’s plan of adjustment, the court may nonetheless confirm the plan
only if it finds that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, and has not accepted, the plan.”7
While the Bankruptcy Code goes on to define what is included in the
“fair and equitable” requirement, the Code does not explain the meaning of
“discriminate unfairly.”8 Until recently, this unfair discrimination rule had
not arisen under Chapter 9 and, until the recent municipal bankruptcy
filings in Detroit and Stockton, this rule had received very little scholarly
attention.9
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2010). Chapter 9 provides for the adjustment of debts of a
“municipality,” defined as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a
State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2010).
5. In re Centr. Falls, 468 B.R. 36, 72 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012).
6. In re Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2010).
9. Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609 (2014) [hereinafter Hynes & Walt, Pensions &
Property Rights] (analyzing the priority in payment of a municipality’s pension obligations);
Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal
Bankruptcy 1 (Virginia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014-55, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493529 [hereinafter Hynes & Walt, Fair & Unfair
Discrimination] (describing the law defining the unfair discrimination standard and the
categories of circumstances where discrimintion between co-equal classes is allowed) ; C.
Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J.
85, 114 (2014); see also DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., CAN PENSIONS BE RESTRUCTURED IN
(DETROIT’S) MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY? 4 (2013), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/can-pensions-be-restructured-in-detroits-municipal-bankruptcy
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Even though Central Falls, Stockton, and Detroit all ultimately gave
superior treatment to some group of claimants relative to other similarly
situated claimants, only in Detroit did the court have to squarely confront
the unfair discrimination rule.
Central Falls effectively paid its
bondholders in full while reducing its pension obligations by half, but the
pensioners consented to this treatment.10 Stockton ultimately declined to
impair its pension obligations, effectively paying them in full, while
distributing only a negligible amount to other unsecured creditors.11 In that
case, though, the unsecured creditors were placed in the same class as the
pension claimants and that class approved the plan; hence, the unfair
discrimination rule did not apply.12
Detroit’s bankruptcy confirmation, on the other hand, had to address
the unfair discrimination rule even after the city had settled with the most
vocal plan opponents. The court articulated a novel interpretation of this
rule, providing perhaps the most significant such decision since the
Supreme Court’s depression-era cases of Avon Park13 and Paradise
Irrigation District.14
The court stated that determining whether
discrimination among creditor classes is unfair is a matter to be determined
according the court’s “judgment of its conscience regarding that
discrimination.”15
The court’s articulation of this rule rejects case law interpreting unfair
discrimination in the context of corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. This departure reflects, in part at least, the court’s
concern that unfair discrimination be interpreted in light of the purpose of
municipal bankruptcy law. Thus, the court considered “mission-related”
justification for Detroit’s decision to discriminate among classes of
unsecured creditors.16

(analyzing the legality of restructuring Detroit’s bankruptcy).
10. Steven Church & Steve Ludsin, Central Falls, Rhode Island, Bankruptcy Exit
Approved, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0906/central-falls-rhode-island-bankruptcy-exit-approved.html.
11. Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Cali., NEW
YORK TIMES DEAL BOOK (October 30, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/
judge-approves-bankruptcy-exit-for-stockton-calif/?_r=0.
12. Id.
13. Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 141 (1940)
(discussed infra in Part III.A.1).
14. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 538 (1946) (discussed infra in
Part III.A.2).
15. Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes at 30, In re City of Detroit Bankr.,
No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. MI. Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FI
NAL_for_Release.pdf .
16. Id.
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This article contends that the court’s analysis can be – and should be –
viewed through the analytical framework that was developed by Professor
Bruce Markell and adopted by many courts in corporate reorganization
cases.17 That framework, the Markell Test, permits discrimination to the
extent it comports with the parties’ ex ante expectations or compensates the
favored party for contributions to the reorganization.18 This latter factor is
at times referred to as the “new value corollary.”19 The Markell Test
considers many of the same factors that informed the Detroit court’s
judgment. Furthermore, this article contends that the new value corollary,
properly interpreted, more effectively addresses the court’s mission-related
concerns.
The article begins with a description of Chapter 9’s structure and
policies. Chapter 9 is a pared-down form of Chapter 11’s corporation
reorganization law, including many of the Chapter 11 procedures for
negotiating and confirming a debt composition plan. But, Chapter 9
intentionally excludes most of Chapter 11’s creditor protections, as
Congress has attempted to carefully craft Chapter 9 to minimize federal
intrusion into municipal governance. Thus, while Chapter 11 serves the
dual (and sometimes inconsistent) purposes of promoting reorganization
and of maximizing returns to creditors, Chapter 9’s purpose is solely to
confirm a debt composition plan.
Part II focuses on the unfair discrimination rule’s function within the
limited structure and scope of Chapter 9. This rule limits how the
municipal debtor may allocate its reorganization value among similarly
situated classes of creditors. Although this rule has not played a significant
role in corporate reorganizations, it is likely to do so in municipal
bankruptcies, especially to the extent municipal debtors seek to impair their
pension obligations under Chapter 9.
Part III then analyzes the meaning of the unfair discrimination rule,
first looking at its historical meaning under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. Then, consistent with that historical use and with Chapter 9’s
incorporation of the unfair discrimination rule from Chapter 11, this part
will then examine the Chapter 11 case law interpreting the unfair
discrimination rule.
Part IV then discusses how these rules should be interpreted in the
Chapter 9 context. This part argues that the unfair discrimination rule
should be interpreted the same in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11; however, the
new value corollary within the unfair discrimination rule should be applied
17. Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998) (discussed in detail infra Part III.B.2).
18. Id. at 242.
19. David R. Kuney, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 505, 505 n.3 (1999)
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more flexibly in municipal bankruptcies. While there is some policy
support for a narrow interpretation of new value in Chapter 11, consistent
with that chapter’s structure and policy, the structure and policies of
Chapter 9 require a more flexible approach in municipal bankruptcies.
This approach would provide a more predictable and useful tool in
analyzing unfair discrimination issues, as it would provide a structure for
determining not just whether discrimination is fair but also how much
discrimination is fair. It would further provide a better framework for
dealing with the challenging question of the relative treatment of tort and
other involuntary creditors.
I.

CHAPTER 9’S STRUCTURE AND POLICY

Municipal bankruptcy law shares key features of corporate
reorganization law.20 For this article, the key similarity is that both
Chapters 9 and 11 are constructed around the confirmation of a debt
composition plan, which confirmation carries with it the “extraordinary
power” to bind even dissenting creditors.21 At the same time, though, there
are important and significant differences between Chapter 9 and Chapter
11. This section describes the similarities and key differences between the
two chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, and it argues that these differences
reflect the different policies underlying these chapters.22
The main similarity between municipal and corporate bankruptcy law
is the centerpiece of a debt composition plan. Chapter 9 directly
incorporates many of Chapter 11’s plan-related provisions – for instance, it
incorporates the rules relating to the classification of claims23, acceptance

20. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 410 (2014) (highlighting that authors have compared municipal
bankruptcy law to corporate bankruptcy, striking similarities between Chapter 9 and Chapter
11); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 356 (2010) (describing municipal bankruptcy law as “corporate
bankruptcy mutatis mutandis”).
21. See Pryor, supra note 9, at 114 (“The extraordinary power of plan confirmation lies
in its power to bind non-consenting members of a class when the class votes in favor of the
plan.”). As discussed infra, this is handled in two ways. First, creditor voting is by class,
such that a class as a whole may approve the plan over the objections of a minority of the
class members. Second, even if a class of creditors opposes the plan, the court may
nonetheless impose the plan over that objection if the requirements of Section 1129(b) are
satisfied.
22. Moringiello, supra note 20, at 410 (“Constitutional concerns, coupled with
municipal bankruptcy’s original limited goal of solving the holdout problem, explain the
somewhat skeletal nature of Chapter 9.”).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1978).
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of the plan by class,24 and most of the plan confirmation requirements.25 In
other aspects, Chapter 9 draws from Chapter 11 with slight variations. For
example, under Chapter 11, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a
plan during the first 120 days of the case, after which creditors can propose
a plan,26 while under Chapter 9 only the debtor has the right to propose a
plan.27
At the same time, though, Chapter 9 significantly departs from other
aspects of Chapter 11’s plan negotiation process in two primary ways.
First, Chapter 9 does not include Chapter 11’s statutory priority structure;
second, Chapter 9 does not include many of Chapter 11’s creditor
protections. These protections give creditors governance rights in
corporate reorganization, i.e., which give creditors the ability to participate
in corporate decision making within the bankruptcy context.28 Each of
these will be discussed in turn in the following sections.
A. Statutory Priority Schemes
Chapter 11 imposes a statutory priority structure that accords
distribution priority to special claimants, such as administrative expenses,
employee wage claims, and certain unpaid taxes.29 Thus, a plan under
Chapter 11 must pay priority creditors in full before distributing any value
to the general unsecured creditors. For example, a corporate debtor must
pay employees’ back wages (up to the statutory limit30) before paying
general unsecured obligations to trade creditors.
Chapter 9, in contrast, prioritizes only administrative expense claims.31
There are no other priority unsecured claims in the municipal bankruptcy
context, such that there is no requirement that employees’ unpaid wages be
paid ahead of other general unsecured creditors – all unsecured claims
incurred before the bankruptcy petition share equal priority.32
The legislative history is silent as to why Chapter 9 does not include
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1984).
25. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(8), (a)(10), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B)
(2010).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2005).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (1978).
28. See Moringiello, supra note 20, at 456 (detailing Congress’ merging of standard
bankruptcy law with features of corporate bankruptcy).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(8) (2010), respectively.
30. Currently, that amount is $12,475 for unpaid wages earned in the six months prior
to the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2010).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2010) (incorporating only Section 507(a)(2) from the creditor
priorities section).
32. Pryor, supra note 9, at 120 (arguing that the lack of statutory priorities means that
all unsecured creditors should be treated equally).
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these statutory priorities. Perhaps it reflects a policy decision to make
Chapter 9 “plain vanilla” in order to ensure that it is as useful to as many
states as possible – that is, Congress may have been reluctant to impose
statutory priorities out of fear that these priorities might make Chapter 9
either unattractive or simply unworkable in some states. Hynes and Walt
argue, for instance, that a uniform federal priority for pensioners might not
be workable given that “[s]tates can differ with respect to their central and
local fiscal conditions, as well as in the extent to which they regulate
pension obligations incurred by their municipalities.”33 A federal rule of
priority might even deter states from using Chapter 9, as it would “force
some states to allocate the direct and indirect costs of a municipal
bankruptcy in a way they would not prefer.”34
Perhaps Congress intended for states to prioritize their own debts.35
While under modern bankruptcy law, state law priorities do not apply in
bankruptcy unless the Bankruptcy Code specifically incorporates them, this
was not the case when Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy
law.36 Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, bankruptcy law incorporated state
law creditor priorities.37 Thus, when Congress enacted the first municipal
bankruptcy laws in 1934 and 1937, federal bankruptcy law honored statecreated priorities. When Congress eliminated state law priorities from the
bankruptcy laws in the Chandler Act, Congress simply never amended the
municipal bankruptcy laws to address this change. Thus, perhaps the
continued lack of statutory priorities is simply an accident of history.
Finally, it may be that Congress deliberately refused to impose
statutory priorities out of federalism concerns, as any distributional
requirements would impose federal policies on the state.38 This explanation
33. Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 660.
34. Id.
35. See Adam J. Levitin, Detroit Eligibility and Pensions, CREDITSLIPS, (Dec. 3, 2013,
8:45
PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/12/detroit-eligibility-and
pensions.html (suggesting that the municipal bankruptcy laws leave room for state priorities
and arguing for the implicit use of states prioritizing their own debts).
36. See David Skeel, What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy 9 (Univ. of
Penn. Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 1387, 2014), available at
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2388&context=faculty_scholar
ship (“As originally enacted, the 1898 Act incorporated any nonbankruptcy priorities that
were honored under state or federal law. Concerned that there was little or nothing left for
general unsecured creditors in most cases after state law priorities were satisfied, lawmakers
largely eliminated state law priorities under the Chandler Act of 1938, which made major
changes to the 1898 Act.”).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Lynn Hume, Bill Would Give More Rights to Municipal Employees in
Bankruptcies, SOURCEMEDIA (June 4, 2014), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washingtonbudget-finance/bill-would-give-more-rights-to-municipal-employees-in-bankruptcies1063100-1.html (raising the federalism concern of states being governed by federal rules).
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seems entirely consistent with Congress’s continued care to ensure that
municipal bankruptcy law does not overstep into local municipal
governance.
Whatever the reason or justification, Congress has opted to not impose
a federal priority scheme on municipal debtors in Chapter 9, a decision in
line with its decision to leave debtors in control of municipal governance.
B. Governance Mechanisms
Governance-wise, Chapter 11 empowers creditors to participate in
corporate decision making in ways not allowed in Chapter 9.39 For
instance, corporate creditors have the right to be heard relating to any nonordinary course business decisions the debtor may want to pursue40; may
move to have a trustee appointed to displace management41; and may
propose their own plan of reorganization if the debtor fails to propose one
or fails to propose one that garners sufficient creditor support.42 None of
these governance provisions are applicable in Chapter 9. In fact, Chapter 9
specifically prohibits any interference with municipal governance. Section
903 acknowledges that a state retains the power “to control, by legislation
or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the
political or governmental powers of such municipality, including
expenditures for such exercise.”43 Section 904 further prohibits court
interference with municipal governance:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor
consents or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay,
order or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with –
Any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
Any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
The debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing
property.44

39. Some, in fact, have characterized corporate bankruptcy as a component of
corporate governance generally. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, The Careful Use of
Comparative Law Data: The Case of Corporate Insolvency Systems, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 193, 195 (“Most recently, a theory of insolvency law is evolving that views
bankruptcy as a corporate governance mechanism. Perhaps because my interest in
bankruptcy has evolved from earlier research into patterns of debt financing, I have
subscribed to a governance view of bankruptcy.”).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2010).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2010).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2005).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (1984).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1978).
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While there has been some debate about whether municipal
bankruptcy law should impose more governance restrictions, it clearly does
not do so now.45 As Juliet Moringiello explains, Chapter 9’s focus on debt
adjustment – and exclusion of reorganization governance – reflects both
constitutional concerns as well as “municipal bankruptcy’s original limited
goal of solving the holdout problem.”46
When Congress created the first municipal bankruptcy law in 1934, it
did so with the narrow purpose of providing a means for municipalities to
re-negotiate their bond debts.47 At the time, under the then-current
Contracts Clause jurisprudence, it was understood that any state law
procedure to re-negotiate bond debt requires unanimous bondholder
consent, as imposing terms on a dissenting holdout bondholder would be an
unconstitutional impairment of contract.48 Thus, municipal bankruptcy law
under Chapter IX was structured to address this one problem, and this one
problem alone.
The singular focus of Chapter IX was evident in its structure. A
municipal debtor could obtain bankruptcy relief only after negotiating a
plan of debt composition that had been approved by a majority of its
creditors.49 This entry-level requirement made it practically impossible for
45. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 494 (1993) (“We
believe that federal bankruptcy law warrants serious reexamination. In its present form, it
serves little use: it does little to address serious city problems and, by restricting state laws
directed at solving the holdout problem, even impedes the ability of states to institute
superior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone broke.”).
46. Moringiello, supra note 20, at 410.
47. See Kimhi supra note 20, at 365 (explaining that Chapter IX’s primary purpose
was overcoming the holdout problem).
48. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (describing the Contracts
Clause and the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy law stating “the natural and
reasonable remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available under
state law by reason of the restriction imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the
impairment of contracts by state legislation.”) and Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement Dist. No. 1., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was careful to
provide that ‘no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’
This she may not do under the form of a bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she
can accomplish the same end by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress so to
do.”) (internal citations omitted). But see Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits,
the Recession, and A Modern View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 2199 (2011)
(arguing that the recent financial crisis provides a justification for impairing public
employment contracts).
49. See Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653, 655
(1937) (“The petition shall state that a plan of composition has been prepared, is filed and
submitted with the petition, and that creditors of the petitioner owning not less than 51 per
centum in amount of the securities affected by the plan . . . have accepted it in writing.”).
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a debtor to use bankruptcy for any broader purpose than to adjust a single
type of indebtedness.50
Despite the limited focus of the original Chapter IX, the Supreme
Court found it to be unconstitutional as it threatened to interfere with local
fiscal affairs, thus exceeding the scope of Congress’s constitutional
powers.51 The Court reversed course two years in upholding a (slightly)
revised municipal bankruptcy law, holding that, to the extent the federal
law encroaches on municipal fiscal affairs, it does so only at the request of
the states themselves.52
Following the Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937, Congress
expanded the powers available to a debtor under Chapter IX and eased the
entry requirement by getting rid of the requirement that the municipality
have a pre-approved plan.53 But even in doing so, Chapter 9 remained
focused on debt adjustment and carefully circumscribed the law to prevent
federal intrusion into municipal governance.54 The legislative history to the
1976 revisions to Chapter IX explains that the changes did not expand the
scope of the law:
Chapter IX provides essentially for Federal court supervision of a
settlement between the petitioner municipality and a majority of
its creditors. A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to
satisfy its creditors totally and finally. Therefore, the primary
purpose of a Chapter IX is to allow the municipal unit to continue
operating while it adjusts or refinances creditor claims with
minimum (and in many cases, no) loss to its creditors.55
Two years later when Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws with

50. Such pre-approved (or “pre-packaged” filings) are permitted under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, and as commenters have noted, such pre-packaged filings almost
necessarily handle just one layer of the capital structure. See Marc S. Kirschner, Dan A.
Kusnetz Laurence Y. Solarsh, Craig S. Gatarz, Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The
Deleveraging Tool of the ‘90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L.
REV. 643, 661 (1991) (“As a practical matter, the pre-packaged bankruptcy unfolds in a
manner similar to an out-of-court exchange offer: there is a negotiation with major
bondholders, the preparation of offering literature (a combination exchange offer and
disclosure statement) and the negotiation of a plan.”).
51. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532
(1936).
52. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 27.
53. Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976). Following New York City’s financial
crisis in the early 1970s, Congress expanded Chapter IX in order to make it more workable
for large cities.
54. Moringiello, supra note 20, at 455.
55. H. R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 6 (1975).
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress created Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code with only technical changes to the old Chapter 9.56
Chapter 9 incorporates many of its provisions from Chapter 11, the new
corporate reorganization chapter, thus linking the two chapters together.57
Because a significant portion of Chapter 9 includes provisions
incorporated from Chapter 11, some have argued that Congress intended
municipal bankruptcy to be more or less similar to corporate
reorganizations.58 Omer Kimhi has described Chapter 9 as “a corporate
bankruptcy procedure mutatis mutandis.”59
The legislative history, though, clearly reflects an understanding that,
despite their procedural similarities, Chapter 9 is significantly different in
scope and purpose than Chapter 11:
The general policy underlying the municipal debt adjustments
chapter is the same as that underlying the [business]
reorganization chapter. The Chapter gives the debtor a breathing
spell from debt collection efforts in order that it can work out a
repayment plan with its creditors. There are two major
differences from general reorganization law: first, the law must
be sensitive to the issue of the sovereignty of the States; second, a
municipality is generally not a business enterprise operating for
profit, and there are no stockholders. These differences dictate
some limitations on the court’s powers in dealing with a
municipal debt adjustment, and some modifications of the
standards governing the proposal and confirmation of a plan.60
The narrow scope of Chapter 9 – with its focus on confirming a debt
readjustment plan – and its conscious effort to limit federal intrusion in to
municipal governance reflect these concerns about state sovereignty. They
also reflect the narrower policy of Chapter 9. Whereas Chapter 11 serves
the dual, and at times conflicting, policies of maximizing returns to
creditors and facilitating the debtor’s reorganization,61 the legislative
history emphasizes that “the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow the
municipal unit to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances creditor
56. Kimhi, supra note 20, at 368-69.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 369 (“Indeed, Congress’s underlying assumption was that the two chapters
are more or less the same.”).
59. Id.
60. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 263 (1977).
61. See Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 476 (2011) (rehabilitating corporate debtors
and maximizing recoveries to creditors are the primary goals of Chapter 11).
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claims with minimum (and in many cases, no) loss to its creditors.”62
II.

FUNCTION OF THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE

The unfair discrimination rule is an element of the “cram down”
requirements that must be met before a court can confirm a non-consensual
debt adjustment plan. These requirements are found in Section 1129(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code and are, thus, applicable in Chapter 11 cases. Section
901 makes these requirements applicable in municipal bankruptcy as well.
These requirements state that, in order for a court to confirm a debt
adjustment plan over the objection of a class of creditors, the court must
find that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable,
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and
has not accepted, the plan.”63
While these rules apply only in the event that there is a dissenting
class of creditors, they shape the plan negotiation process by providing a
background set of rules applicable in the event the debtor cannot achieve
consensual support for its plan. As Kenneth Klee, one of the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code, explained shortly after the new law was enacted, even
though the cram down rules apply only if a class dissents, “one of the
hypotheses of the Code is that the rule will also affect the negotiating
posture of the debtors and creditors with respect to formulation of a plan.”64
Melissa Jacoby has made this point specifically about the Detroit plan
confirmation process, explaining that “[t]he strength of the cramdownrelated arguments contribute to the leverage of the parties to compromise
and settle.”65
These requirements impose a limit on a debtor’s freedom in allocating
value under a debt adjustment plan.66 In both Chapters 9 and 11, the
Bankruptcy Code provides a baseline distributional requirement that the
plan be in the best interests of creditors.67 In Chapter 11, this means that
the creditors must receive as much under the plan as they would have
received under a Chapter 7 liquidation.68 In Chapter 9, it has been
62. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 263.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010).
64. Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 134 (1979).
65. Melissa Jacoby, Q & A on C of D, CREDIT SLIPS (June 6, 2014),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/06/q-a-on-c-of-d.html.
66. See Pryor, supra note 9, at 85-86 (noting that the “fair and equitable” and unfair
discrimination rule limit the plan’s freedom in allocating risk).
67. Id. (identifying the best interests requirement as a third limitation on risk
allocation).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2010).
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suggested that this requirement means that creditors must receive at least as
much as they would have received under state collection laws, generally
under a mandamus action.69 A debtor has freedom to allocate any value
above this baseline – the “reorganization surplus” – but that freedom is
constrained by the creditors’ right to oppose the debtor’s plan. The court
may confirm a plan over the objections of dissenting creditors only if it
finds that the plan is (1) fair and equitable and (2) does not discriminate
unfairly as to those dissenting creditors.
These two rules – the unfair discrimination rule and the fair and
equitable rule – thus enable a court to confirm a plan even over the
objection of a class of creditors but only if the court finds that their
interests were protected. As discussed in the following section, these two
rules were conflated at one point, but they have developed into two freestanding tests.
A. Development of Unfair Discrimination Rule
Historically, the fair and equitable rule and the unfair discrimination
rule were conflated, with the fair and equitable rule serving as a broad set
of principles that included that of unfair discrimination.70 Both rules
derived from principles developed in the equity receivership cases of the
1900s.71 During that time, there was no reorganization procedure for
corporations. Instead, corporate debtors sought to reorganize through an
equity receivership. Under this receivership procedure, a corporation or
railroad attempting to reorganize its debts could do so through a voluntary
workout or, barring that, through a legal device called an equity
receivership.72 An unsecured creditor could petition a court to appoint a
receiver to take control of the railroad’s assets. At the foreclosure sale, a
committee of old creditors would then “purchase” the railroad through a
credit bid – that is, not by contributing new cash but by bidding with the
face value of their notes. As Stephen Lubben notes, “[o]ne of the most
controversial features of receiverships was the frequency with which
69. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers
eds., 16th ed.) (“The concept should be interpreted to mean that the plan must be better than
the alternative that creditors have. In the chapter 9 context, the alternative is dismissal of the
case, permitting every creditor to fend for itself in the race to obtain the mandamus remedy
and to collect the proceeds.”).
70. See Markell, supra note 17, at 232-33 (1998) (discussing how Congress, courts,
and commentators treated the fair and equitable rule as including the unfair discrimination
rule).
71. Id. at 228-31.
72. Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1445 (2004).
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existing shareholders were able to maintain their position in the
reorganized railroad, despite the failure to pay creditors in full.”73
In response to these concerns, the equity receivership courts created
equitable protections for these unsecured creditors who got squeezed out
between the secured creditors and the old shareholders, which protections
were broadly cabined under the requirement that the plan be “fair and
equitable.”74 Courts would variously refer to these protections as
embodying basic principles of debt compositions that shareholders could
not be paid before dissenting creditors and that creditors should be treated
equally.75
When drafting the first municipal, corporate, and railroad bankruptcy
provisions in the 1930s, Congress required that the debt composition plan
be approved by creditors and that the court be satisfied that the plan “is fair,
equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors, and does not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors”.76
Congress revised the business bankruptcy provisions shortly thereafter
in the Chandler Act and removed the unfair discrimination language,
leaving only the requirement that the plan be “fair and equitable.”77 The

73. Id.
74. John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963,
972 (1989) (characterizing that decision as prohibiting the “old bondholders and
stockholders” from “‘squeezing out’ the intermediate unsecured debt”).
75. See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939)
(commenting on the discrepancy between shareholders and creditors suggesting that
equality should be attained) and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913)
(same); see also Bruce Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 78-90 (1991) (exploring the relationship between the
absolute priority rule and new value principles by examining the historical origins).
76. Pub. L. No. 251, § 80(e), 48 Stat. 798, 801 (1934). The Supreme Court found this
law to be unconstitutional in 1936, after which Congress passed a Revised Municipal
Bankruptcy Act in 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937), which was nearly identical.
It kept the unfair discrimination rule, stating that the court shall confirm the plan “if satisfied
that (1) it is fair, equitable and for the best interests of the creditors and does not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.” § 83(e), 50 Stat. at 658
(emphasis added to highlight the changed language). The railroad amendments required the
judge to find that the plan “is fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors, and
does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors.” Pub. L. No. 74-381, §
77(e), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935). The corporate amendments required the judge to find that
the plan “(1) it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class
of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible.” Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B(f), 48 Stat. 911, 919
(1934)
77. The Bankruptcy Act of 1938, commonly known as the Chandler Act, required that
the plan be “fair and equitable.” Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 221, 52 Stat. 840, 897 (1938); see
Markell, supra at note 17, at 232. (“Each of these revisions omitted the prohibition of unfair
discrimination, inserting in its place a requirement that ‘the plan [be] fair and equitable, and
feasible.’”).
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legislative history explains that Congress did not intend to remove the
unfair discrimination protection; rather, Congress viewed this protection as
inherent within the broader “fair and equitable” requirement, thus making
redundant to include the unfair discrimination language.78
Congress subsequently removed the “fair and equitable” language
altogether from business bankruptcies under Chapter XI (which applied to
smaller businesses, at least in theory).79 The justification for this removal
was that these creditor protections were not needed in these smaller
business bankruptcies.
Both the fair and equitable rule and unfair discrimination rules,
however, remained in the municipal bankruptcy laws under Chapter IX. As
discussed infra in Part III.A, the Supreme Court recognized that the unfair
discrimination rule was a subset of the broader fair and equitable principles
developed in those old equity receivership cases and early bankruptcy
cases.
When Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, it re-introduced both the unfair discrimination and fair
and equitable rules in the cram down procedures for Chapters 9 and 11.80 It
did so directly in Chapter 11 in Section 1129(b), and it amended Chapter 9
to incorporate the Chapter 11 requirements.
B. Vertical vs. Horizontal Protections
The legislative history clearly contemplates these two rules as serving
different functions, although the history is not very helpful in interpreting
the exact parameter of these functions.81 Bruce Markell, in one of the most
influential articles on the unfair discrimination rule, has characterized these
functions as providing both vertical and horizontal limits on a debtor’s
freedom to allocate the reorganization surplus:
Just as the fair and equitable requirement regulates priority
among classes of creditors having higher and lower priorities,
creating inter-priority fairness, so the unfair discrimination
provision promotes intra-priority fairness, assuring equitable

78. S. REP. NO. 75-1916, at 35-36 (1938) (Senate Report No. 1916 accompanied H.R.
8046, which was the bill ultimately enacted) (“a prohibition against any unfair
discrimination in the plan in favor of any creditors or stock-holders and the express
statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.”).
79. KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 390 n.2083 (2009).
80. Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
81. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 416-17 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6373.
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treatment among creditors who have the same level of priority.82
Although the absolute priority rule and the unfair discrimination rule
impose different types of limitation, they both serve the same function of
placing a limit on how a plan can allocate value among classes of creditors.
These limitations can only be invoked by a dissenting class of creditors –
thus, there must be such a dissenting class; however, they cast a shadow
over the plan negotiation process.83 These rules create the legal backdrop
against which plan negotiations take place, thus shaping the parties’
negotiation positions even prior to a vote on the plan.
Most case law and scholarship has focused on the vertical limits of the
fair and equitable rule, as a frequent issue is whether a debtor should be
able to allocate value to old stockholders even when it has not paid its
creditors in full.84 Congress clarified that the fair and equitable rule
includes the so-called absolute priority rule, which requires that dissenting
senior claimants be paid in full before the plan distributes any value to
junior claimants.85 The cases and scholarship on this rule – while diverging
on how it should be applied— all recognize that it functions to limit a
debtor’s freedom to allocate the reorganization surplus, i.e., the value in
excess of the debtor’s liquidation value.86
Whereas the fair and equitable rule’s vertical limitation plays a
significant role in shaping plan negotiations in the Chapter 11 context, it is
less likely to do so in the Chapter 9 context.87 There are no shareholders in
this context, and so the traditional fight between the creditors and the
shareholders is simply not present. This is not to say that the fair and
equitable rule has no meaning in this context, as that rule is broader than
just the absolute priority rule.88 But the lack of shareholders eliminates a

82. Markell, supra at note 17, at 228.
83. Klee, supra note 64 and accompanying text; Jacoby, supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
84. Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9 at 630 (“Most prior
writing on municipal bankruptcy has focused on the test of vertical equity.”).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
86. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 585
(1998) (explaining that the only debatable issue relates to adding new value to the company
to overcome the creditors’ objections).
87. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial
Distress, 88 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 633, 652 (2008) (considering the limited applicability of
the absolute priority rule in protecting the interests of unsecured creditors).
88. See Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 31, 33 (2012) (discussing the application of the fair and equitable rule in the context of
non-profit corporations which likewise have no shareholders: “Simply because Chapter 11
does not contemplate nonprofits’ unique structures and operational goals does not mean that
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common source of disputes under the fair and equitable rule. Further, the
fair and equitable rule’s vertical protection is generally less applicable as
municipal bankruptcy has less “verticality” to protect, as the priority
structure is flatter in the municipal context, as there are no statutory
priorities.
In this flatter priority structure, the unfair discrimination role is likely
to play a significant role in limiting the debtor’s ability to allocate the
reorganization surplus in Chapter 9. This is particularly so if municipal
debtors seek to use bankruptcy to impair pensions obligations, as has
happened in Detroit and Stockton, California. This is so because, even
though their claims arise from different sources, pension and bond claims
occupy the same priority level. Accordingly, the unfair discrimination rule
will shape a municipal debtor’s negotiations in crafting a plan that will
allocate more (or less) value to pensioners relative to bondholders and other
unsecured creditors.89
A brief description of Detroit’s plan of adjustment here serves to
illustrate the unfair discrimination rule’s impact in a municipal bankruptcy
plan that proposes to impair public pensions.
C. Detroit
This section will describe Detroit’s negotiations with its unsecured
creditors, principally its pension claimants and bondholders.
The
negotiations and ultimate resolution highlight the role of the unfair
discrimination rule. As both pensioners and bondholders have claims of
the same legal status, the unfair discrimination rule provided the legal
framework for negotiations among these claimants, as the rule would apply
if any class voted against the plan.
The cornerstone of these negotiations is a settlement that combines the
two most controversial aspects of the case: the treatment of pensioners and
the treatment of Detroit’s world-class art collection at the Detroit Institute
of Arts (DIA). This settlement has been called the Grand Bargain.90
The Grand Bargain is a multiparty settlement involving the state of
the guiding policies behind the requirements of Chapter 11 should not apply with the same
force and intention to nonprofits. In an effort to bring courts one step closer to applying the
same rigorous approval criteria to nonprofits’ reorganization plans, this Article focuses on
one crucial aspect of courts’ evaluation of plans—the fair and equitable standard.”).
89. See Skeel, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that the unfair discrimination rule “may
prove extremely important in a case like Detroit – much more important than commentators
have recognized thus far.”).
90. David A. Skeel, From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit 15 (Univ. of Penn.
Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 1420, 2014), available at
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1420.
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Michigan, a consortium of private institutions, the DIA, and Detroit’s
pensioners. It contemplates four major moves: (1) the City will transfer the
DIA assets to a public trust that will keep the artwork in Detroit in
perpetuity;91 (2) the DIA and private institutions (such as the Kellogg
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, General Motors, the United
Autoworkers) will contribute no less than $466 million over 20 years to
fund the pensions;92 (3) the state of Michigan will likewise contribute the
net present value of $350 million over 20 years to fund the pensions93; and
(4) the pensioners will drop their objections and appeals and support the
plan.94
The foundations and the DIA successfully raised the requisite funds;
the Michigan legislature approved a bill that will send a one-time $194.8
million to the pensions;95 and the retiree committee endorsed the plan.96
The remaining question leading up to Detroit’s trial on plan confirmation
was whether, if the bondholders opposed the plan, the court would find that
the plan unfairly discriminated in favor of the pensioners.
The question, then, was whether this arrangement could be confirmed
without the consent of the bondholders, who were cut out of this Grand
Bargain. The bondholders argued that the City could get more money from
an auction of the DIA assets – enough that might actually fully fund the
pensions and pay the bondholders.97
Without the consent of the bondholder class of creditors, the plan
could be confirmed only under the “cram down” provisions of Section
1129(b), which require the court to find that the plan is fair and equitable
and does not unfairly discriminate as to the class of bondholders.98
91. Fifth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 51, In re
City of Detroit Bankr., No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 2014) [hereinafter Fifth
Amended Plan] (“Transfer of DIA Assets. On the Effective Date, the City shall irrevocably
transfer the DIA Assets to DIA Corp., as trustee, to be held in perpetual charitable trust, and
within the City limits, for the primary benefit of the residents of the City and the Counties
and the citizens of the State.”)
92. Id. This includes $366 million from the foundations and an additional $100 million
from the DIA. The foundations are listed in Exhibit B to the Disclosure Statement.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 50-51.
95. Kathleen Gray, Michigan Senate OKs historic $195M Detroit aid package;
Snyder’s signature next, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 4, 2014), http://www.freep.com/
article/20140603/NEWS06/306030043/Detroit-bankruptcy-pensions-artwork.
96. Karen Pierog, Detroit Retiree Committee Reaches Deal on Pensions, Healthcare,
REUTERS (April 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/usa-detroitbankruptcy-idUSL2N0NI01920140426.
97. Steven Church, Detroit Bond Insurer Syncora Calls 75% Debt Recovery Fair,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-03/syncoraseeks-75-debt-repayment-in-detroit-restructuring.html.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2010). The court must also find that the plan is feasible and in

DAWSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

20

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/12/2015 4:54 PM

[Vol. 17:1

Leading up to the confirmation hearing, Detroit reached settlements
with the two main bond insurers, increasing the distributions to those
insurers in exchange for their support of the plan. Two “catch all” classes
of unsecured creditors continued to oppose the plan, however. The first
was the “convenience class”99 – that is, those with small claims – and the
second included individual plaintiffs with claims against the city for
injuries such as tort and civil rights damages.100
III.

THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE’S MEANING

The prior section described the function of the unfair discrimination
rule in limiting a municipal debtor’s allocation of the reorganization value.
It concluded by considering the role of unfair discrimination in the
confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment. This section will discuss how
courts have interpreted this rule.
There has been no case law interpreting this rule under Chapter 9, so
this section will begin in Part III.A with a historical analysis of this rule
under the prior municipal bankruptcy law under Chapter IX of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Although the unfair discrimination rule served a
slightly different procedural rule under Chapter IX, the case law under
Chapter IX provides some guidance as to the meaning of the unfair
discrimination rule.
Part III.B will then discuss the Chapter 11 case law interpreting the
unfair discrimination rule. Chapter 9 directly incorporates the unfair
discrimination rule from Chapter 11, and as discussed in Part III.A, the rule
in both chapters draws from the same historical roots.
A. Chapter IX: Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation
As discussed above, Chapter IX was originally devised for the narrow
purpose of giving municipalities a tool to solve the dissenting creditor
holdout problem.101 Similar to modern bankruptcy law, the old Chapter IX
provided two ways that the debtor could solve this holdout problem. The
first was through supermajority voting: the plan could be confirmed with
the best interests of all creditors, neither of which is a foregone conclusion. But the unfair
discrimination part is likely to play the largest role both in continued negotiations with the
bondholders and in any litigation concerning the plan.
99. Fifth Amended Plan, supra note 91, at 6, ¶ 65 (defining “convenience claim” as
consisting of any “other unsecured claim” for $25,000 or less).
100. Id. at 18, ¶ 224 (defining “Other Unsecured Claim” as a catch all category that
includes “Section 1983 claims, Indirect Employee Indemnity Claims and Indirect 36th
District Court Claims”).
101. Supra Part I.B and text accompanying notes 45 & 46.
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the approval of creditors holding two thirds in amount of the claims in each
class.102 Alternatively, if there was a dissenting class, the debtor could
confirm the plan “if provision is made in the plan for the protection of the
interests, claims, or liens of such creditors or class of creditors.”103 So just
as in modern bankruptcy law, there was supermajority voting within classes
and a cram down procedure applicable when there was a dissenting class.
Whereas the unfair discrimination rule today is part of the cram down
rules, under Chapter IX the unfair discrimination rule could be raised even
if the plan were accepted by all classes.104 As originally enacted in 1934,
Chapter IX required that a court find that “the plan is fair, equitable, and
for the best interests of the creditors, and does not discriminate unfairly in
favor of any class of creditors.”105 After the Supreme Court found this law
to be unconstitutional in Ashton106, Congress passed a Revised Municipal
Bankruptcy Act in 1937, which required that again that the plan be fair and
equitable and in the best interests of the creditors, but this time said that the
plan “does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of
creditors.”107
Thus, whereas the modern unfair discrimination rule serves an interclass protection within each level of priority, the Chapter IX rule also
applied intra-class, as it could be raised by the dissenting creditors within
any class. The two Supreme Court cases infra discussing the rule under
Chapter IX both involve such intra-class disputes.
1. Avon Park, Florida
In 1940 the Supreme Court considered whether Avon Park, Florida,
had unfairly discriminated against bondholders in its plan of adjustment
under Chapter IX.108 Avon Park had hired an agent, R.E. Crummer & Co.,
to negotiate the plan of adjustment (remember, at that time municipalities
had to have a pre-approved plan of adjustment in order to file
102. Bankruptcy Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 251, § 80(d), 48 Stat. 798, 801 (1934) ,
invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513
(1936).
103. Id. § 80(d)
104. Id. § 80(e) (requiring the judge to find that the plan satisfies the unfair
discrimination and fair and equitable rules, and that it “has been accepted and approved as
required by the provisions of subdivision (d) of this chapter.”).
105. Id.
106. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
107. Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658
(1937) (emphasis added).
108. Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 141
(1940). Chapter IX was the precursor to current Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under
Chapter IX, the plan of adjustment was referred to as a “plan of composition.”
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bankruptcy).109 The City was to pay Crummer for these services by
assessing charges against the participating bondholders.110 Crummer went
about soliciting assents from bondholders but, in order to meet the requisite
two-thirds approval, bought claims from dissenting bondholders.111
The City placed all the bonds in the same class, giving them equal
treatment within the class.112 The requisite supermajority approved the
plan, but one of the dissenting bondholders objected to the plan. The
dissenting creditor argued, inter alia, that the plan violated the unfair
discrimination rule because Crummer was receiving more under the plan
than the other bondholders, as Crummer was to receive payment for its
services on top of the class-wide distribution.113
The Court agreed that this amounted to unfair discrimination.114 It
explained that unfair discrimination rule reflects the principle of “equality
of treatment of creditors,” a rule drawn from “the old § 12.”115 It explained
that under that previous law and its antecedents, “a composition would not
be confirmed where one creditor was obtaining some special favor or
inducement not accorded the others, whether that consideration moved
from the debtor or from another.”116 The Court cited early 1900s business
cases to support that principle, and then said “[t]hat principle has been
imbedded by Congress in Chapter IX by the express provision against
unfair discrimination.”117
The Court went on to note that the preferred treatment given to
Crummer might be appropriate if the debtor could establish that Crummer’s
benefit reflected the reasonable value of its services.118 The Court appears
to be relying on the Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, Co. for this
principle, citing this case a few sentences later.119
Los Angeles Lumber is known as one of the foundational cases
establishing the “new value rule” (or “new value corollary”).120 Los Angeles
109. Id. at 141-42.
110. Id. at 141.
111. Id. at 142. Although the court did not specifically find that this was the purpose of
Crummer’s claim purchases, it said that, “the inference seems clear that some of them were
acquired in order to facilitate consummation of the composition by placing them in friendly
hands.” Id.
112. Id. at 142-43.
113. Id. at 143.
114. Id. at 147-48.
115. Id. at 147.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 148.
119. Id. (citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106 (1939)).
120. Michelle Craig, Note, The New Value Exception: A Plea for Modification or
Elimination, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. 781, 781 & n.2 (1995) (citing Los Angeles Lumber and
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Lumber did not involve the unfair discrimination rule; rather it involved the
absolute priority rule, as the plan proposed to distribute value to the old
stockholders even though creditors would not be repaid in full.121 The Court
found the plan to be not fair and equitable because it departed from the
absolute priority rule.122 But the Court said that such a departure may be
permitted if in exchange for a new value contribution.123
Avon Park suggests that this same “new value” principle would apply
in the unfair discrimination context, a suggestion that the Court further
explored in Mason v. Paradise Irrigation District, below.
2. Paradise Irrigation District
In another case penned by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court again
reviewed a plan of adjustment under Chapter IX to determine if it unfairly
discriminated among bondholders within the same class.124 In that case,
Paradise Irrigation District in California sought to re-negotiate its bonds
with the aid of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.125 The RFC lent
$252,500 to the irrigation district, to be used to redeem its bonds at a
roughly 50% discount.126 In exchange, the irrigation district was to issue
new 4 per cent bonds to the RFC.127
The RFC, applying its loan, then purchased claims representing
approximately 92% of the principal amount of the bond debt, but the
remaining 8% held out.128 Paradise was then forced to file for relief under
Chapter IX, offering to pay the holdouts the same 50% value as the
assenting bondholders had received from the RFC.129 RFC, which had
purchased the bonds of the assenting creditors, was thus receiving 4 percent
refunding bonds while the holdouts were to receive 50 cents on the dollar.
One of the holdouts argued this constituted unfair discrimination.
The Court held that this was not unfair discrimination because the
RFC had not “by purchasing bonds in the market acquired merely a
noting that “the United States Supreme Court established the “new value exception” to the
absolute priority rule).
121. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106, 111 (1939).
122. Id. at 119.
123. Id. at 121.
124. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 538 (1946).
125. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a Depression Era independent
government agency created under the 1932 Finance Reconstruction Act in order “to provide
emergency financing facilities for financial institutions to aid in financing agriculture,
commerce, and industry and for other purposes.” H.R. REP. NO. 72-243 (1932).
126. Mason, 326 U.S. at 539.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 539-40.
129. Id.
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speculative position in the plan of composition” but “has underwritten the
whole refinancing program.”130 It had thus provided value to the
bankruptcy proceeding, and the Court again cited Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber for the proposition that, “[i]t has long been recognized in
reorganization law that those who put new money into the distressed
enterprise may be given a participation in the reorganization plan
reasonably equivalent to their contribution.”131 That is, again drawing from
business bankruptcy cases, it held that the new value exception applies to
unfair discrimination, explaining how, “That rule is based on practical
necessities. Without the inducement new money could not be obtained.”132
3. Analysis: Equitable Principles
Although there have been significant changes in municipal bankruptcy
law since Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation, these cases provide two
important points in interpreting and applying the unfair discrimination rule.
The first is that the unfair discrimination rule embodies part of the old
equitable principles developed in the early 1900s to protect creditors. One
is that of equality among creditors. The other is that a bankruptcy plan may
distribute greater value to those creditors that have contributed new value
to the reorganization effort.
The principle of equality among creditors can best be understood as
stating the aspiration that equally situated creditors will receive equal
treatment. It should not be read as a requirement that a plan provide
exactly equal treatment to all similarly situated creditors.133 Where
Congress intended such a rule, it has explicitly said so. For example, the
Bankruptcy Code requires that all creditors placed within the same class
receive equal treatment.134 In contrast, the unfair discrimination rule
presumes that some discrimination is appropriate. As Skeel states, “No
unfair discrimination is not the same thing as no discrimination.”135 The
principle of equality among creditors does not elucidate when
discrimination crosses the line into unfair discrimination.
The new value principle in these cases may be interpreted either as an
exception to the unfair discrimination rule or as a separate factor to be
considered under the “fair and equitable” principles. The general premises

130. Id. at 541.
131. Id. at 541-42.
132. Mason, 326 U.S. at 542.
133. But see infra note 143 (noting that a few outlier cases have indeed read the unfair
discrimination rule so narrowly as to say that any material discrimination is per se unfair).
134. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(4), 1322(a)(3).
135. Skeel, supra note 9, at 19.
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of the rule – that parties which contribute to the reorganization effort
should get special treatment – is reflected in various portions of the modern
Bankruptcy Code. For example, a court may award statutory administrator
priority (thus, effectively guaranteeing payment in full) to those expenses
incurred by the bankruptcy that represent “the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate”.136 These may include the professional
fees incurred in administering the case.137 In fact, if Avon Park or Paradise
Irrigation were brought under current law, they most likely would be
litigated not under the unfair discrimination rule but on a determination of
whether the expenses paid to the favored party reflected the necessary costs
of effectuating the plan.
The second broad principle to be derived from these cases is that the
unfair discrimination rule in Chapter IX has long been understood as
arising from the same historical origins as under corporate reorganization
law. Both Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation cite old equity receivership
cases as well as corporate bankruptcy cases, showing that the rule in both
contexts draws from the old “fair and equitable” principles first developed
in the equity receivership cases. Thus, modern Chapter 9’s direct
incorporation of portions of Chapter 11 is fully consistent with the way
municipal bankruptcy law historically overlapped with business bankruptcy
law.
B. Chapter 11 Case Law
Because Congress incorporated Chapter 11’s unfair discrimination
rule into Chapter 9, this section of the article will explore how courts have
interpreted this rule under Chapter 11. Although perhaps the Chapter 11
case law interpreting the unfair discrimination rule should not be
controlling in Chapter 9 cases – an argument discussed and ultimately
dismissed infra in Part IV – for this part of the article it is at least
instructive to look at the Chapter 11 interpretation of the unfair
discrimination.
When Congress added the unfair discrimination rule in section 1129
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, this marked the first time in
roughly 40 years that the unfair discrimination rule had been applicable in
corporate bankruptcy. Congress had included the unfair discrimination rule
in the very first corporate bankruptcy law in 1934, but it subsequently
removed this rule a few years later.138 So when Congress re-introduced the
unfair discrimination rule in creating Chapter 11 in 1978, there was not
136. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2005).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 328 (2005).
138. See supra Part II.

DAWSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

26

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/12/2015 4:54 PM

[Vol. 17:1

much prior case law to guide its application in Chapter 11. The legislative
history of this rule provided little guidance, offering the unhelpful
statement that “[t]he criterion of unfair discrimination is not derived from
the fair and equitable rule or from the best interests of creditors test.”139 As
Markell remarks, “This statement must be seen as odd, given Congress’
remarks regarding municipal arrangements just two years earlier, in which
unfair discrimination was said to be a derivative of the fair and equitable
principle.”140 The House Report goes on to provide examples of unfair
discrimination in the situation of contractual subordination agreements, but
the main point seems to be merely that the equally situated classes should
receive equal treatment – a statement that provides no help in determining
when discrimination reaches the point of unfairness.141
Because there was not extensive Chapter XI case law from which to
draw, courts looked to case law interpreting the “unfair discrimination”
language contained in Chapter 13’s consumer debt composition rules,
developing what has been called the Four Factor Test, discussed in detail
below. This test was criticized by many courts as being unworkable,
leading to the development of an alternative test has been widely adopted,
based on an influential law review article by Bruce Markell.142 This test
finds a rebuttable presumption of unfair discrimination whenever a
dissenting class receives materially different treatment from a similarly
situated class – a test sometimes referred to as the presumption-based
approach or the Markell Test. Each of these two tests is discussed in order
below.143
139. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 417 (1977).
140. Markell, supra note 17, at 236.
141. Supra note 139, at 416-17.
142. Markell, supra note 17, at 242. Courts that have accepted Markell’s test include: In
re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 122 (D. Del. 2006); In re Quay Corp., Inc.,
372 B.R. 378, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, Inc., 264
B.R. 850, 863 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2001); In re Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R.
213, 231-32 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 702 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1999).
143. It should be noted there are two other ways some courts have interpreted the unfair
discrimination rule, but they are outlier approaches. A few courts have simply applied a
bright-line rule that any discrimination at all is per se unfair discrimination. See G. Eric
Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Unresolved Doctrines of
Classification and Unfair Discrimination, 55 BUS. LAWYER 1, 47 (1999) (citing In re
Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 571 n.16 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 1989)). Others have
said that, since the legislative history discussing this rule did so in the context of
subordination agreements, the unfair discrimination rule only applies if there is an intercreditor subordination agreement. See In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir.
1986) (arguing that “the concept of unfair discrimination applies to plans in which claims or
interests have been subordinated.”). But because these two rules both elevate the legislative
history of the rule over its text, and because they both render the word “unfairly”
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1. Chapter 13-Derived Four-Factor Test
The Four-Factor Test is derived from Chapter 13 case law interpreting
the classification rule that permits consumer debtors to separately classify
certain unsecured claims provided there is no unfair discrimination.144 A
brief description of the Chapter 13 rule, consequently, is helpful for
understanding the Chapter 11 case law.
Chapter 13 provides consumer debtors the option of entering a debt
composition plan, which allocates the debtor’s disposable income among
its unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. Under the old Chapter XIII, the
debtor had to place all its unsecured creditors within the same class.145
Debtors struggled to complete such plans under Chapter XIII, in part
because of the practical reality that a debtor might be under pressure to pay
more than a pro rata portion to certain debts, such as debts shared with a
co-debtor or debts that were non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.146 Since
Chapter XIII did not provide for separate treatment for co-debts, a debtor
would have to make additional payments outside the plan, thereby
jeopardizing the debtor’s ability to make all required payments under the
plan.147
In response to this concern, Congress permitted debtors under Chapter
13 to “designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided under
section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any
class so designated.”148 Congress later amended this to specifically address
co-debts: “such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if
an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently
than other unsecured claims.”149 The legislative history acknowledged that
co-debtor claims are theoretically identical to other unsecured claims, but
separate classification reflects the practical reality that a debtor will attempt
meaningless, this section will set these two aside as outlier interpretations.
144. Markell, supra note 17, at 242 (describing the four-part test developed from
Chapter 13 cases).
145. See In re Wolff, 22 B.R. 510, 514 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (ruling that “Section 646
of the Bankruptcy Act governed plans under former Chapter XIII. While the plan could
provide for secured creditors ‘severally,’ it required that unsecured creditors be provided for
‘generally.’ See, § 646(1), (2) of the Bankruptcy Act as amended. This was read to mean
that all unsecured creditors were entitled to equal treatment. Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed.
Vol. 10, ¶ 28.02.”).
146. S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 18 (1983) (noting that a rigid requirement that a Chapter 13
debtor make equal payments to all unsecured creditors may undermine the plan’s
feasibility).
147. Id.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2010).
149. Id. The co-debtor provision was added in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 316, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (1984).
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to make additional payments under co-debts.150 Allowing a debtor to make
such payments under the plan makes it more likely that the debtor will in
fact complete the plan.151 In contrast,”[a] result which emphasizes purity in
classifying claims does so at the price of a realistic plan. Neither debtors
nor creditors benefit from such a right approach.”152
Although “unfair discrimination” in Chapter 13 is a classification rule,
i.e., it limits the debtor’s ability to create separate classes of unsecured
claims, classification in Chapter 13 has purely distributive consequences.
This is because under Chapter 13, the classes of creditors do not vote on the
debtor’s proposed plan; rather, the classes exist as part of the proposed
distribution framework.153 The debtor’s plan must propose distributions to
be made to each class, and all members within the class are required to
receive the same distribution.154 So the only way to give different treatment
to a group of creditors in Chapter 13 is to separately classify them.
Based on the policy that separate classification should be permitted in
order to make it more feasible for the debtor to actually complete her
payments under the composition plan, Chapter 13 courts developed the
following four-factor test to determine whether separate classification
amounted to unfair discrimination:
whether the discrimination has a reasonable basis;
whether the debtor can carry out a plan without the discrimination;
whether the discrimination is proposed in good faith; and
whether the degree of discrimination is directly related to the basis or
rationale for the discrimination.155
Faced with the question of whether a Chapter 11 plan unfairly
discriminates against a dissenting class of creditors, courts borrowed this
Chapter 13 classification rule.156 Some courts, though, have noted that the
four factors are redundant, as discrimination without a reasonable basis
would appear to be in bad faith.157 Further, the plan itself must be proposed
150. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,¶ 1322.05 (Allen N Resnick et al. eds., Lexis Nexis
16th ed. 2014) (2014) (noting that “[a]lthough there may be no theoretical differences
between co-debtor claims and others, there are important practical differences” that must be
recognized) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 17-18 (1983)).
151. S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 18 (1983).
152. Id.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010) (setting forth the requirements of plan confirmation).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2010).
155. In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1991).
156. In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
157. In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 700-01 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
(“Although many courts have applied the four-factor test in chapter 11 cases to decide the
unfair discrimination issue, some courts, finding its elements redundant, have pared it down

DAWSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/12/2015 4:54 PM

PENSIONERS, BONDHOLDERS, AND UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION

29

in good faith, and so the unfair discrimination rule is not necessary to
monitor the bona fides of the plan.158 Thus, some courts have boiled these
four factors down to two questions (1) is there a rational basis for the
discrimination? and (2) is the discrimination necessary for the
reorganization?159
These two standards themselves are largely inter-related, as the
necessity for the reorganization is itself a rational basis for the
discrimination; that is, discrimination that is necessary for the
reorganization per se has a rational basis. Thus, courts applying this test
have found that discrimination has a rational basis when it is necessary to
fulfill the Bankruptcy Code’s best interests test,160 when the discrimination
will protect an essential relationship with suppliers,161 and when
discrimination in favor of vendors is necessary for the reorganization.162
2. Markell Test
In response to perceived theoretical and practical shortcomings of the
Four-Factor Test, many courts have adopted an alternative test proposed by
Bruce Markell in a highly influential law review article.163 Markell
proposed a test that creates a rebuttable presumption of unfair
discrimination whenever a plan treats a dissenting class of creditors
materially differently than another class that shares the same distributional
priority.164
The debtor can then rebut the presumption of unfair
discrimination in two ways. First, the debtor can “prov[e] that the
difference in treatment is attributable to differences in the prepetition status
of the creditors.”165 That is, the discrimination is not unfair if the lower
value (or increased risk) is consistent with the nature of the creditors’

to one or two factors.”).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2010).
159. In re Dow Corning, supra note 157 at 701..
160. In re 203 N. LaSalle St.P’ship, 190 B.R. 567, 586 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) aff’d sub
nom. Bank of Am., Illinois v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1996) aff’d
sub nom. Matter of 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997) rev’d sub nom.
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 119 S.
Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999).
161. See AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 B.R. 510 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (showing
separate classification for business debtor’s insurance company and material suppliers may
be permitted if debtor can show they are essential for debtor to continue in business).
162. In re Creekstone Apartments, 168 B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(“Protection of the debtor’s credit-worthiness with its vendors is vital to its successful
reorganization.”).
163. Markell, supra note 17, at 249-50.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 250.
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claims. Alternatively, the debtor can rebut the presumption of unfair
discrimination by demonstrating “that contributions will be made by the
assenting classes to the reorganization, and that these contributions are
commensurate with the different treatment.”166 In other words, if the debtor
can show that the favored class contributed offsetting new value, consistent
with the Paradise Irrigation case under Chapter IX.
The Markell Test, sometimes referred to as the Presumption-Based
Standard, was designed to address two perceived problems with the Four
Factor Test. Primarily, it recognized that the Four Factors really boiled
down to just this: “whether the proposed discrimination has a reasonable
basis and is necessary for reorganization.”167 While this necessity standard
may make sense in the Chapter 13 context in which there may be only one
plan that the debtor is capable of confirming and carrying out, Markell
argues that the concept of necessity is meaningless in the business
bankruptcy Chapter 11 context: “Any nonindividual Chapter 11 case
theoretically is capable of confirmation through plans which do not
discriminate.”168 As examples, he says:
a court could confirm a liquidation plan, or it could confirm a
plan that extinguished all claims and interests, created one class
of new equity interests, and then distributed those interests pro
rata to creditors and equity holders. With such a plan, which
could be confirmed in any case, discrimination is wholly
absent.169
The second problem is that the Four Factor Test does not reflect the
theory and function of the unfair discrimination rule (or of the cramdown
requirements generally). The Four Factor Test, as stated above, is drawn
from Chapter 13’s unfair discrimination test, and the Chapter 13 test is one
of creditor classification. The cramdown requirements, on the other hand,
do not deal with classification; rather, they concern distribution.
Classification is a question of voting procedure; the unfair discrimination
and fair and equitable rules, in contrast, are distributional. As previously
described, the distinction between classification and distribution is
irrelevant in Chapter 13, as creditors do not vote on a plan of debt
composition in that chapter. But in Chapter 11, in which creditors do vote,
classification and distribution questions are analytically distinct. Courts are

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 254.
Id.
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cognizant of this difference.170 Yet, the Four Factor Test redundantly
contains some of the same elements as the tests for improper
classification.171
Further, Markell contends that the Four Factor Test, with its focus on
the necessity of the discrimination, improperly focuses on questions of plan
feasibility, i.e., a question of whether the plan is likely to succeed.172 That
is, the inquiry as to whether discrimination is necessary for a successful
reorganization is really a question of whether the discrimination makes the
plan more feasible than it would be without the discrimination. Feasibility
questions, though, are separately handled under Section 1129(a)(11), which
requires the court to find that the debtor is not likely to re-file for
bankruptcy following confirmation.173
The Markell Test eschews this classification-type language and
relative feasibility analysis. Instead, it proposes a test that reflects the old
fair and equitable requirements’ function of limiting a debtor’s ability to
allocate value in a way that disregarded the creditors’ ex ante expectations,
namely, that the creditors would be paid before stockholders (the absolute
priority rule) and that creditors of the same priority level would receive the
same treatment. These equitable principles also recognized that the debtor
could nonetheless allocate value as compensation to creditors’ contribution
to the reorganization.
The Markell Test embodies these principles in the two ways in which
a debtor can rebut the presumption of unfair discrimination: “If the
treatment preserves the prebankruptcy expectations, or appropriately
rewards contributions to reorganization, it should be permitted; if it
unjustifiably frustrates those expectations, it should not.”174
Thus, the Markell Test recognizes that the different treatment may be

170. See e.g., In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Permitting
separate classification of the Teamsters Committee’s claim does not automatically result in
adoption of the plan. The Teamsters Committee is still protected by the provisions of
subsections (a) and (b), particularly the requirements of subsection (b) that the plan not
discriminate unfairly and that it be fair and equitable with respect to the Teamsters
Committee’s claim.”); see also, In re Lightsquared Inc., 513 B.R. 56, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2014) (noting that classification and unfair discrimination are separate issues that should be
analyzed separately); Markell, supra note 17 at 241 (“Whether such discrimination
‘discriminate[s] unfairly’ against the noncontributing classes is an issue distinct from the
propriety of the separate classification, and one upon which bankruptcy courts have not yet
reached a consensus.”).
171. See, e.g., In re Lightsquared, 513 B.R. at 83, 99 (examining whether there was a
rational basis for separate classification and whether the allegedly discriminatory treatment
was justified by a rational basis).
172. Markell, supra note 17 at 255.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2010).
174. Markell, supra note 17, at 252-53.
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justified by examining the parties’ expectations, suggesting, for example,
that a plan might provide for a greater recovery for tort claimants over
voluntary claimants, such as bondholders, because “there is every reason to
believe that tort claimants have, if anything, a higher expectation of
payment.”175 Likewise, different treatment may be justified to compensate
creditors that are essential to the reorganization. For example, a plan may
distribute more to a labor union if that union’s good will is essential to the
reorganization effort: “it is not unfair to return to that union more than its
aliquot share of reorganization value since its efforts were responsible for
the increase in that value.”176
3. Analysis: “Necessity” and “New Value”
The Markell Test’s structure is not only more workable and likely to
yield more consistent results, but it is also, as Markell notes, more
consistent with the traditional function and interpretation of the unfair
discrimination rule.177 This rule is a distributional rule, providing a
fundamental protection to dissenting classes of creditors, and it is not a
classification rule. Thus, reference to Chapter 13’s classification rule is
slightly misplaced.
As far as providing a workable rule, the Markell Test reflects a
superior approach. Instead of giving courts four redundant and, at times,
self-referential factors to consider, the Markell Test provides a structure
that reflects the purpose of the rule – to provide a baseline standard of
equality among creditors – and justifications for deviating from this
baseline.
Theoretically, the Markell Test also provides a rule that is more
consonant with the function of the cram down requirements. Markell is
absolutely right that classification questions should be treated separately
from unfair discrimination questions. The Four Factor Test, which
contains significant overlap with the general approach to handling improper
classification arguments, conflates these issues, or at least threatens to do
so.178
At the same time, though, the Markell Test shares some of the
analytical shortcomings of the Four Factor Test. In both, it is nearly

175. Id. at 261.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 257.
178. Some courts appear to have conflated these issues altogether, perhaps because the
prevailing tests are so similar. See, e.g., In re City of Colorado Springs Spring Creek Gen.
Imp. Dist., 187 B.R. 683, 689 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (stating that issues of gerrymandering
can and should be addressed as part of the “unfair discrimination” analysis of § 1129(b)).
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inevitable for the court to apply the unfair discrimination rule without
considering the necessity of the discrimination or the feasibility of the
plan.179 Even though the Markell Test seems to avoid the Four-Factor
Test’s inquiry into the necessity of the discrimination, ultimately, this
necessity standard re-surfaces in the new value contribution analysis.
Under the Four Factor Test, deviation from the principle of equality among
creditors may be permitted if the court finds it is necessary to reorganize.180
Under the Markell Test, deviation may be acceptable if it reflects a new
contribution from the favored class, and if the favored class’s new
contribution may be providing a service or value that is necessary to the
reorganization effort.181 For example, when facing the question of whether
a plan unfairly discriminates in favor of a class of creditors whose
continued relationship with the debtor is important to the reorganization
effort, it is necessary to determine whether the favored treatment is
commensurate with the value of that continued relationship.182 Courts have
applied the Four Factor Test to approve discrimination in favor of vendors
when the “[p]rotection of the debtor’s credit-worthiness with its vendors is
vital to is successful reorganization.”183 Likewise, a plan may discriminate
in favor of a labor union when the debtor could not survive without the
union and the discrimination “appears reasonably proportional to the
consequences of failing to receive [the union’s] support.”184 The Markell
test would likewise permit discrimination in these cases, as a plan that
discriminates in favor of creditors whose continued work with the debtor
may be considered a “contribution to preservation of value through the
plan.”185 And Markell endorses the favored treatment for a key labor
union:
If, for example, the good will of a key union is necessary for the
profitability of the reorganized debtor, and that necessity is
proved by the plan proponent, then it is not unfair to return to that
union more than its aliquot share of reorganization value since its
efforts were responsible for the increase in that value.186
179. See Pryor, supra note 9 (making a similar, but distinct, argument that the
conflicting notions of requisite fairness under Chapter 9 serves a settlement inducing
function).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 160160-162
181. See supra text accompanying notes 174-176
182. Markell, supra note 17, at 250.
183. In re Creekstone Apartments, 168 B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994).
184. In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting, 149 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1992).
185. In re Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, 264 B.R. 850, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001).
186. Markell, supra note 17, at 261.
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Thus, the Markell Test recognizes contributions to the reorganization effort
not as “necessary to the reorganization” but as a contribution of value.
Even though the Markell Test, then, does not eliminate the necessity
factor, it improves the analysis of this factor by placing it within the more
familiar language and framework of the new value analysis – an analysis
applied in Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation. Further, by placing the
necessity analysis under the new value rule, the Markell Test also provides
a theoretical limitation on the amount of permissible discrimination: the
plan’s discrimination must be proportional to the amount of the new value
contribution.
In order to apply this theoretical limitation on the amount of
discrimination, it is necessary to quantify the amount of that contribution.
This problem has received significant attention as applied in the absolute
priority context, i.e., when old shareholders contributed sufficient new
value in order to justify their receiving value even when unsecured
creditors are not paid in full.187 The absolute priority context is different in
at least one important aspect; namely, Congress codified this rule in section
1129(b)(2) but did not codify the unfair discrimination rule.188 The
Supreme Court has intimated that, by codifying the absolute priority rule
without mentioning the new value “rule,” Congress thereby eliminated the
new value rule altogether.189 Since Congress has not codified the unfair
discrimination rule, there can be no similar argument that Congress
intended to foreclose the new value contribution as applied to unfair
discrimination.
Even assuming the new value rule continues to apply to the absolute
priority rule, there has been substantial and significant debate over whether
courts should apply a flexible or strict approach to measuring that new
value contribution.190 Some have argued that the court should apply this
rule more flexibly as needed to facilitate the debtor’s reorganization.191
The argument is that the reorganized entity may not be able to succeed
without the continuing input of the old owners.192 Others have argued that
the rule should be applied narrowly, as a strict interpretation will help
ensure that the residual class of claimants will ultimately make the decision
187. Baird, supra note 86, at 584 n.37 (collecting cases and commentary about the new
value corollary).
188. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2010).
189. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434 (1999); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
190. Baird, supra note 86, at 584-85.
191. Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of the Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SERV. AM. L. 9
(1991).
192. Id.
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of whether the debtor should liquidate or reorganize.193
As David Skeel has argued, this uncertainty about the new value rule
reflects the tension inherent in the two goals of corporate reorganization
law – namely, “protection of creditors’ rights and the promotion of a
successful reorganization of the debtor.”194 While in some cases these
goals may overlap, in others they may very well diverge, and the
Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance as to which goal should
predominate. This normative question underlines a major split among
bankruptcy theorists.195 The crux of this split is a policy question about
who should have control over the allocation of the reorganization surplus,
the debtor or the creditors. For those scholars who believe the primary goal
of Chapter 11 is to maximize the value of the estate, creditors should have
greater control over the allocation process. Specifically, control should be
in the hands of the class of creditors holding the residual claims against the
debtor.196 These scholars view strict adherence to the absolute priority rule
as giving control to these residual claimants. For those scholars that
believe the primary goal of bankruptcy is to facilitate the debtor’s
reorganization – thus reducing the impact of corporate failure on investors,
suppliers, employees, and the community – the debtor should retain control
over the allocation of the reorganization surplus and should be allowed to
deviate from the absolute priority rule when necessary to improve the
debtor’s chance of recovery.197
These questions – both doctrinal and normative – apply equally in the
unfair discrimination rule context. How courts should evaluate the asserted
new value contribution raises the same issues in the unfair discrimination
context as in the absolute priority context: to what degree should the plan
proponents be free to deviate from a baseline distributional rule?
The Markell Test does not answer this question, leaving bankruptcy
courts with substantial leeway in determining the amount of the asserted
new value contribution. But by re-framing the “necessity” question as one
of new value, this approach at least highlights the true nature of the
necessity question and places it within a framework that is already
relatively familiar to bankruptcy courts and the parties.

193. Baird, supra note 86, at 583-84.
194. David A. Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy’s
Contribution Rule Doctrine After Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 223 (1989); see also
Baird, supra note 86 at 584 (“This tension is reflected in the debate over what is called the
‘new value exception’ to the absolute priority rule.”).
195. Baird, supra note 86, at 583-84.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE IN CHAPTER 9

There is good reason to think that unfair discrimination should mean
the same thing in Chapter 9 as it does in Chapter 11 business
reorganizations: the rule has the same historical roots in the two chapters
and modern Chapter 9 directly incorporates the unfair discrimination rule
from Chapter 11. At the same time, given the different nature of
municipalities and their stakeholders (pensioners, in particular), one might
credibly argue, as did the Detroit bankruptcy court, that the rule might
apply differently in municipal bankruptcies. As discussed above, the
Detroit confirmation order and opinion found the discrimination in favor of
pensioners and bondholders to be fair “in light of, among other things, (a)
the circumstances of the City’s Chapter 9 Case, (b) the purpose of chapter
9, which is to adjust an insolvent municipality’s debt so that it can provide
adequate municipal services and (c) the Court’s conscience, as informed by
the Court’s experience, education, and sense of morality.”198
In this section, I argue that, despite these mission-related and fairness
concerns related to the vulnerability of municipal pensioners and other
stakeholders, the unfair discrimination rule in municipal bankruptcy law
should mean the same as it does in Chapter 11: the plan should not be able
to treat one class of creditors substantially better than a similar class of
dissenting creditors, unless that treatment comports with pre-bankruptcy
expectations or reflects a new value contribution. Mission-related and
fairness concerns should matter, if at all, only to the extent that they satisfy
either of these two justifications for discrimination. Further, these missionrelated and fairness concerns are actually better addressed through this
Chapter 11 approach.
A. No Special Chapter 9 Unfair Discrimination Rule
The statutory argument that the unfair discrimination rule should have
the same meaning in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11 is a simple and strong one:
Chapter 9 directly incorporates the Chapter 11 rule into Chapter 9.199 When
Congress intended Chapter 9 to vary from Chapter 11, it did so by either
excluding specific provisions of Chapter 11 or by re-defining Chapter 11
198. Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of
Detroit at 22, ¶ 21, In re City of Detroit Bankr., No. 13-53846, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 12,
2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/docket8272.pdf
[hereinafter Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan].
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2010) (incorporating Section 1129(b)(1)); see also Hynes
& Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637-38 (stating that Chapter 9
indirectly relies on the implicit standard of unfair discrimination because section 901(a)
imports by reference 1129(b)(1)).
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concepts. For example, Chapter 9 incorporates the absolute priority rule as
pertaining to secured and unsecured creditors but not as to equity
holders.200 Chapter 9 also uses the “best interests of creditors” language but
separately defines that in Section 943(b)(7), rejecting the Chapter 11
definition of that requirement.201 When Congress wanted to have a unique
Chapter 9 rule, it explicitly did so, thus supporting a presumption that
Congress did not intend a unique unfair discrimination rule.202
This approach is in accord with the historical usage of the unfair
discrimination rule in municipal bankruptcies. The unfair discrimination
rule was virtually identical in the original municipal and corporate
bankruptcy laws, both drawing from the old fair and equitable principles
developed in the equity receivership cases.203 And as seen in the Avon Park
and Paradise Irrigation cases, courts used the business case law as support
in interpreting the unfair discrimination rule under Chapter IX.204
At the same time, though, the historical usage of the unfair
discrimination rule may be inapposite to modern municipal bankruptcy law
under Chapter 9. Under the old Chapter IX, applicable to Avon Park and
Paradise Irrigation, municipal bankruptcy served merely as a tool to
impose a bond workout on dissenting bondholders.205 Even though a
debtor under Chapter IX, in theory, could have impaired claims other than
those of bondholders, the pre-arranged nature of Chapter IX bankruptcies
made this practically impossible. So these cases considered only whether a
debtor could discriminate among bondholders and never considered the
question of value allocation among different classes of creditors. Thus, this
case law may be of limited value as applied to Chapter 9, which gives
debtors significantly more leeway to propose a plan that will impair the
claims of other stakeholders, such as those of contract counterparties,
employees, and retirees.
The relatively broader scope of current Chapter 9 than its predecessor
Chapter IX supports a more flexible interpretation of unfair discrimination
in modern municipal bankruptcies. David Skeel has opined that a court
should have wide latitude in determining whether a plan favoring
pensioners unfairly discriminates against bondholders and other unsecured
creditors, arguing that the court should be free to take into account the

200. See 11 U.S.C. §901(a) (2010) (incorporating section 1129(b)(2)(A) & (B) but not
section(C), the latter of which applies to equity holders).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2005).
202. Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637-38.
203. Supra part II.A.
204. Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S 536, 541 (1946); Am. United Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940).
205. See supra Part III.A.
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financial impact of municipal bankruptcy law on pensioners.206 In Detroit,
this would mean taking into account that the pensions were modest – not
the sort of eye-brow raising pensions occasionally reported in California or
elsewhere – that Michigan has elected to remove its public employees from
the Social Security system, and that the pensioners were already giving up
some of their medical benefits.207 Thus, the financial impact of impairing
pensions would likely be greater than that of impairing bond obligations,
arguably justifying better treatment for the pensioners than the
bondholders.
These fairness considerations are extremely compelling, as pensioners
are a sympathetic group of claimants; however, they are inconsistent with
the way courts have applied the unfair discrimination rule under Chapter IX
and in modern Chapter 11 cases.208 Historically, the rule has not focused
on the characteristics of the favored stakeholders, even when those
stakeholders are similarly sympathetic.209 Further, the history of the unfair
discrimination rule and its current statutory formulation demonstrate
Congressional intent that the rule have the same meaning in Chapters 9 and
11. That is, there is no support for creating a special Chapter 9 unfair
discrimination rule.
This does not mean the fairness concerns are irrelevant; rather, it
means those considerations are relevant only to the extent those
considerations inform the inquiry into whether the discrimination comports
with the parties’ ex ante expectations or their new value contributions.
Thus, discrimination in favor of pensioners is not fair because pensioners
are a more vulnerable group; however, favoring pensioners may be justified
if that outcome is consistent with the parties’ ex ante expectations or with

206. Skeel, supra note 9, at 19 (arguing that “[w]ith the pensions, no unfair
discrimination may allow Detroit to take into consideration the fact that Detroit’s pensions
are relatively modest, and that Detroit’s pensioners are excluded from the social security
system and thus do not have the same ‘backup’ protection as most other workers.”). Note,
though, that Judge Rhodes has stated multiple times in Detroit’s bankruptcy that the retirees’
hardship should not be a factor, and he reiterated that point in the opening arguments of the
plan confirmation trial. See Nathan Bomey and Matt Helms, Attorney: ‘Detroit Won’t
Recover’ Without Grand Bargain, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/02/detroit-bankruptcy-trial-what-toexpect/14952855/ (reporting on Detroit’s chief bankruptcy lawyer’s opening arguments for
the plan of adjustment where he argues that pensioners be protected from severe cuts).
207. Skeel, supra note 9, at 25.
208. Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637 (“Our point is
simply that, in other reorganization chapters, courts do not allow use of this standard to give
priority to creditors who are at least as sympathetic. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that the unfair discrimination standard, as applied in Chapter 9, does not allow a plan to
favor retirees based on their dire financial circumstances.”).
209. Id.
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the resultant value to the estate.
The following section considers how the Markell Test – in particular
the new value corollary – can more effectively address these fairness and
mission-based concerns.
B. Fairness and Mission-Based Concerns in the Markell Test
The prior section argued that courts should apply the same unfair
discrimination rule in both Chapters 9 and 11, despite the special policy
concerns that arise under Chapter 9. This section contends that the fairness
and mission-based concerns expressed by some commentators and by the
Detroit confirmation order and opinion are better addressed through the
Chapter 11 Markell Test. This approach provides greater predictability as
to the application of the unfair discrimination rule; it provides an analytical
tool for determining not merely whether discrimination may be appropriate
but the acceptable degree of that discrimination; and it provides a better
means of evaluating the claims of involuntary claimants, such as those in
Detroit’s class of Other Unsecured Creditors.210
The Markell Test takes into account fairness and mission-related
concerns to the extent they are related to the parties’ ex ante expectations or
their contributions to the reorganization. For example, the pensioners and
bondholders may both have understood that, in the event of default,
pensioners would receive favored treatment based on the state
constitutional protections for pensions. As with any expectation-based
factor, there is a potential circularity to this argument: because courts are
likely to be sympathetic to pensioners, bondholders should expect to
receive less than pensioners in bankruptcy. But to the extent the parties’
expectations are based on their expected treatment under state law, there is
no circularity problem.
The mission-related concerns that motivated the Detroit bankruptcy
court’s interpretation of unfair discrimination may be encompassed, at least
to some degree, in the new value corollary. For example, favoring
pensioners may be justified in return for the pensioners’ agreement to
support the plan. Such a settlement may be a significant contribution to the
debtor’s ability to confirm a plan of adjustment. Likewise, favoring
pensioners may be justified by the offsetting value to the city in retaining
current employees and attracting future ones.
The benefit of analyzing fairness and mission-based concerns through
the Markell Test is that is not only helps identify whether any
discrimination would be fair but also how much discrimination would be
210. Supra note 100 (defining “Other Unsecured Creditors”).
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fair. The discrimination must be proportionate to the parties’ state-lawbased expectations or their contributions. Thus, the Markell Test helps
provide a limiting principle on the degree to which the debtor may
discriminate.
This limiting principle, though, depends on the debtor’s ability to
quantify, at least approximately, the parties’ expectations and new value
contributions. As discussed supra in Part III.B.3, measuring the amount of
any non-cash new value contribution is difficult, thus potentially
undermining the benefit of any limiting principle. While the new value
corollary has deep roots in municipal bankruptcy, the appropriate means for
quantifying that new value contribution is unclear. Thus in Paradise
Irrigation, the court held that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was
entitled to superior treatment under the plan because it had financed the
plan.211 And in Avon Park, the court suggested that R.C. Crummer might
be entitled to superior treatment for its services in negotiating the debt
composition plan.212 Despite this long-held acceptance of the new value
corollary in unfair discrimination cases, it is not clear how courts should
measure the favored party’s contributions.
As discussed in Part III.B.3, courts have examined this in Chapter 11
cases in the context of the absolute priority rule. Courts have interpreted
the new value corollary in a narrow way, based on Congress’s codification
of the absolute priority rule in Section 1129(b)(2).213 This narrow
interpretation in the absolute priority rule context also comports with the
Chapter 11 policy of placing asset deployment decisions in the hands of the
residual claimants.214
In the unfair discrimination analysis, there is obviously no similar
statutory interpretation argument supporting a narrow reading of the new
value corollary. Congress decided not to define unfair discrimination. In
Chapter 9, the policy justification for a narrow reading is also weaker. The
policy of Chapter 9 is to facilitate a city’s debt restructuring to enable the
city to continue providing services. Unlike Chapter 11, there is no
municipal bankruptcy policy of maximizing returns to creditors.
With this more straightforward policy goal, the interpretation of the
new value rule is likewise more straightforward: it gives the debtor
flexibility to depart from the Bankruptcy Code’s vertical and horizontal
limits on allocating the reorganization surplus.
This greater flexibility is not only consistent with Chapter 9’s goals
but also with its structure. Congress has consciously drafted municipal
211.
212.
213.
214.

Supra Part III.A(2).
Supra Part III.A(1).
Supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
Baird, supra note 86, at 586.
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bankruptcy law to minimize federal intrusion into local municipal fiscal
affairs, so as to avoid the constitutional concerns that led the Court to
overturn the first municipal bankruptcy law.215 Greater flexibility,
accordingly, is consistent with this “light touch” approach, as it gives
debtor municipalities greater control over the surplus.
Leaving this control over the reorganization surplus in the hands of the
bankrupt city is perhaps problematic. Some have argued that Chapter 9’s
“hands-off” approach to local governance could invite cities to strategically
use bankruptcy in order to impose the costs of poor financial decisions on
to creditors.216 Some have argued that courts can, and perhaps should,
exercise more control over the debtor’s resource allocation decisions.217
Even though the Code forbids such intrusion into local governance (absent
consent by the city), these commentators have argued that courts can
effectively assert control by strictly interpreting the confirmation
requirements.218
Leaving aside the normative question of whether bankruptcy courts
should have greater involvement in local governance of bankrupt cities, as
a positive matter Congress has chosen to leave local governance in the
215. See Moringiello, supra note 20 at 410-11.
216. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2012) (stating that “[p]erhaps less
benignly, municipalities that could bear resource adjustments may refuse to fund obligations
because residents regret having taken a risk that subsequently materialized and believe that
relief from another source—a more centralized government or the creditors themselves—is
plausible. Bailout or bankruptcy, that is, may be seen as a viable alternative to resource
adjustments. Eric Monkkonen’s study of late nineteenth-century municipal defaults, largely
precipitated by overinvestment in railroad aid and other ‘internal improvements,’ concluded
that localities systematically could afford to avoid default but preferred to impose the costs
of imprudently incurred obligations on creditors rather than to require that residents bear
them.”).
217. Hynes & Walt, supra note 9, Pensions & Property Rights, at 624 (arguing that
“[f]or this reason, the bankruptcy court in effect has the power to control the municipality’s
use of its assets to pay retirees. Thus, even if the court lacks the legal authority to control the
municipality’s spending, it can take measures that induce the municipality to limit its
spending. In any realistic (practical) sense, the court has power over the municipality’s use
of its assets in a Chapter 9 case.”); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 45, at 474
(pointing out that “[f]ederal bankruptcy courts have been explicitly denied any such powers.
But in practice, the bankruptcy court may have more authority than at first appears. To be
sure, the court may not order reductions in expenditure, sale of property, renegotiation of
contracts, or increase in taxes. But the court can refuse to accept the city’s debt adjustment
plan on the ground that it is not in the ‘best interests of the creditors.’ This provision could
be interpreted to mean that the city is capable of taking steps that would be more
advantageous to the creditors than defaulting, and in most instances this probably means
cutting spending, selling property, or raising taxes. Either of the first two interpretations
would represent a stretch—at least as measured by the cases cited in the relevant legislative
history—but ordering the levy of previously authorized taxes would not.”).
218. Id.
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hands of the bankrupt city. A strict interpretation of unfair discrimination,
then, is inconsistent with this chosen policy.
This does not mean, of course, that a municipal debtor is absolutely
free to allocate value as it wishes, nor is this an argument that a debtor
should be so free. A bankrupt city, like any Chapter 11 debtor, must be
able to show that the discrimination is offset by new value from the favored
party. The difference is that, due to the nature and scope of Chapter 9,
courts should be more deferential to the city’s judgment as to the value of
the favored party’s contribution.
C. Application to Detroit
Applying the Markell Test – along with the proposed flexible
interpretation of the new value corollary – to Detroit’s bankruptcy
confirmation reveals that this test sufficiently, and in some ways more
effectively, addresses many of the fairness and mission-related concerns
underlying the Detroit court’s opinion.
The court broadly stated that unfair discrimination is to be determined
according to the court’s judgment of its conscience regarding that
discrimination.”219 In elaborating on the factors that should inform that
judgment, the court identified four: (1) the overall purpose of Chapter 9, (2)
the policy preferences of the state, (3) the reasonable expectation of the
parties, and (4) the interrelated nature of the settlements that facilitated the
plan.220
The third factor neatly falls within the Markell Test framework by
focusing on whether the discrimination is consistent with the parties’ ex
ante expectations. Likewise, the second factor – the policy preferences of
the state – may also be understood as relating to the parties’ expectations,
as Michigan’s constitutional pension protections would inform the parties’
reasonable expectations.
The second factor, however, does more than this. It suggests that the
court should defer to the distribution policies of the state of Michigan.221
This raises an interesting overall question about the relationship of federal
and state law in municipal bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law generally does not
honor state distribution rights, unless expressed as property rights.222
219. Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 29-30.
220. Id. at 30-32.
221. Id. at 31.
222. See Skeel, supra note 36, at 2 (“As similar as liens and priorities are, the
bankruptcy laws have long drawn a sharp distinction between state-created liens, which are
honored in bankruptcy; and state-created priorities, which are not.”); Hynes & Walt,
Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 647 (“Congress was aware of the place of nonproperty based priorities under the original Bankruptcy Act and their restriction under the
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Municipal bankruptcy law might be different, however, since the
Bankruptcy Code does not impose a distribution priority in Chapter 9, aside
from administrative expense priorities.223 This point raises an important
federalism issue outside the scope of this article; however, it is relevant in
demonstrating the court’s concern about interfering with local governance.
That concern is consistent with the more flexible interpretation of the new
value corollary, as advocated in Part IV.B.
The inter-related nature of the settlements undergirding the city’s plan
of adjustment also fits within the framework of the new value corollary.
The settlements have a value to the estate that potentially justify any
discrimination in favor of the settling parties.
The mission-based justification does not appear to fit at all in the
Markell Test. This justification actually argues against incorporating any
Chapter 11 case law into Chapter 9. The court’s approach effectively
introduces a necessity factor: discrimination is justified if it is necessary to
allow the city to continue to provide services. Discrimination in favor of
pensioners, then, is justified because it is an investment in the city’s
relationship with its employees; in contrast, the court held that the city “has
no similar mission-related investment in its relationships with its other
unsecured creditors.”224
In some ways, this mission-related factor is similar to the new value
corollary. While the mission-related factor asks whether the discrimination
will help the city continue to provide services, the new value approach asks
whether the favored treatment compensates those who will contribute to the
city’s ongoing ability to provide services. The differences are potentially
two-fold. As discussed in the prior section, the new value approach has the
benefit of evaluating whether the extent of the discrimination is necessary.
That is, the city can discriminate in favor of the contributing party, but only
to the extent of the contribution’s value.
The second difference is that the court’s approach does not require
that the benefitted party actually contribute anything; rather, the missionrelated justification merely asks whether the discrimination is related to the
city’s ability to continue providing services. Hence, the court did not say
that the favored pensioners would actually help the city continue to provide
services. Instead, the court found that favoring pensioners is consistent
with city’s interests in “preserving its relationships with its employees and
Chandler Act. It decided not to incorporate priorities set by state law into the Code and
supplied instead a set of bankruptcy priorities. A fair inference is that current bankruptcy
law does not recognize non-bankruptcy priorities that are not based on property rights.”).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2010) (incorporating by reference only the administrative
priority found in § 507(a)(2)).
224. Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 31.
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in enhancing their motivations.”225
The new value approach, in contrast, may be read as requiring that the
pensioners’ themselves actually contribute the offsetting value.226 Since the
pensioners are retired, the favored treatment is actually for work already
performed, not for new contributions.227 Even under this interpretation of
the new value rule, the pensioners contributed new value by withdrawing
their objections to the bankruptcy, waiving claims against the state, and
supporting the plan. In addition, a court may find that favoring the
pensioners provides a goodwill value to the city, which in turn provides the
benefits identified by the court. Indeed, this argument is implicit in the
court’s oral opinion, recognizing that favoring pensioners is important to
the city’s relationship with its workers.228
The Markell Test, then, would provide a more predictable approach
for interpreting the unfair discrimination rule. It would also provide some
limiting principle of the degree of the discrimination. Even more so,
though, it would provide a better lens through which to analyze the claims
of the tort claimants in the class of Other Unsecured Creditors. The court
examines the objections of the tort claimants through the mission-based
lens. Tort claimants, obviously, have no contribution to the city’s ability to
continue providing services. Under this approach, the debtor could propose
to pay tort creditors only pennies on the dollar of their claims. Yet,
Detroit’s plan proposes to pay them approximately 13%.229
The court’s mission-based approach does not inform the question of
whether this is an appropriate level of distribution, relative to the other
classes of unsecured creditors. The court’s approach can only say whether
the city is justified in discriminating between classes of tort claimants,
pensioners, and bondholders.
The Markell Test’s expectations-based rule, on the other hand, might
lead to a contrary conclusion. Tort creditors, obviously, did not voluntarily
extend credit to the city, and thus it is a stretch to consider their
expectations at the time they became creditors. Nonetheless, the
expectation-based approach of the Markell Test might actually argue in
favor of paying tort creditors even more than other creditors, as it is
reasonable to believe that most people would expect that a tort victim
225. Id. at 30-31.
226. Hynes & Walt, Fair & Unfair Discrimination, supra note 9, at 16-17 (making the
argument that: “The problem with the contribution justification is that the greater recovery
received by many active and former workers will vastly exceed the contribution they make
to the municipality’s recovery. This is certainly true of retirees, as they contribute nothing
to the city’s reorganization; they have retired.”).
227. Id.
228. Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 30-31.
229. Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan, supra note 198, at 22, ¶ 20.
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would be paid in full if run over by a city bus. Thus, in the Chapter 11
context, Markell has argued that “there is every reason to believe that tort
claimants have, if anything, a higher expectation of payment.”230
Tort claimants, however, are difficult to fit into any analysis, simply
because of their nature as involuntary creditors.231 Nonetheless, the
Markell Test provides a more workable structure for considering the claims
of such creditors.
CONCLUSION
Although the unfair discrimination rule has largely operated in the
shadows of the absolute priority rule in corporate reorganizations, Detroit’s
bankruptcy demonstrates that it is likely to play a significant role in
shaping municipal debt readjustment plans. This is particularly so in cases
in which the debtor seeks to impair its pension obligations.
Despite important differences between corporate reorganizations and
municipal bankruptcies, this article contends that the unfair discrimination
rule, as understood and articulated in the Markell Test, should apply
equally in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11. Although Chapter 9 raises a host of
policy questions and fairness concerns that might not be relevant in most or
any Chapter 11 cases, these concerns do not support creating a Chapter 9specific unfair discrimination rule. In both Chapters 9 and 11, the debtor
should be able to discriminate in favor of a class of creditors only if that
discrimination is proportionate to the favored party’s ex ante expectations
of payment or the party’s ex post contribution of new value.
The Markell Test can effectively address municipal bankruptcy policy
concerns if courts properly construe the new value corollary. While courts
have interpreted this rule more narrowly in corporate bankruptcies in the
context of the absolute priority rule, there is no statutory support for
similarly interpreting the new value corollary narrowly in the unfair
discrimination context. Further, while there may be some policy grounds
for a narrow interpretation of new value in Chapter 11 even as applied to
the unfair discrimination rule, the policy of Chapter 9 argues in favor of a
more flexible interpretation.
Accordingly, even though Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 both use the same
rule to prohibit unfair discrimination against a dissenting class of creditors,
courts should grant greater deference to a municipal debtor’s evaluation of
creditors’ contributions to the reorganization effort. This more flexible
230. Markell, supra note 17, at 261.
231. Melissa Jacoby, Detroit’s Bankruptcy: End(s) and Means, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 10,
2014)
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/11/detroits-restructuring-ends-andmeans.html#more.
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approach to applying the unfair discrimination rule is consistent with the
structure of Chapter 9 and the policy underlying it, as Congress has
deliberately crafted municipal bankruptcy law to limit federal interference
in municipal governance. Such a deferential approach also advances the
purpose of Chapter 9, which is to enable a municipal debtor to confirm a
plan of debt adjustment with its creditors in order to continue providing
services to its residents.
Properly construed, the Markell Test can more effectively evaluate the
fairness of a debtor’s proposed discrimination, providing not only a
framework for identifying when discrimination may be appropriate but also
a framework for identifying how much discrimination may be appropriate.
Further, the Markell Test provides a superior framework for evaluating the
relative distributions among not only pensioners and bondholders, but also
involuntary creditors.

